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THE AMERICAN JURY
NOTES FOR AN ENGLISH CONTROVERSY
HARRY

KALVEN,

JR. AND

HANS

ZEISEL

Introductory Note: Some time last Fall the British Home Secretary
introduced legislation designed to abolish the unanimity requirement for
jury verdicts in criminal cases, and to allow 10:2 or 11:1 verdicts.
Reports of bribed hold-out jurors, who would hang the jury, were put
forward as the reason for the proposal. In a television debate with the
Home Secretary, Oxford University's distinguished professor of criminal
law, Rupert Cross, drew attention to evidence from "The American
Jury," the study by Professors Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel of
the University of Chicago Law School, published last August by Little,
Brown and Company, Boston. It showed that the proposed reform made
doubtful sense.
The Round Table, a British quarterly, devoted to affairs of the Commonwealth, invited Professors Kalven and Zeisel to present their thesis
in more detail. The authors obliged with a paper which we are happy
to republish here. It offers a fine example of how this type of research
can aid in policy decisions.
The paper caused something of a stir in English public life. On April
4, the London Times devoted five of its seven columns on its editorial
page to the evidence from the United States, and demanded in its leading
editorial that the Home Secretary withdraw his proposal. On April 6,
the liberal Manchester Guardian Weekly joined the Times in its request
to heed the "evidence about the .

.

. American jury."

On April 26 and 27, 1967, the days appointed for the debate in Parliament, 13 members spoke against the proposed law, all referring to the
"American evidence."
Remarked Sir Lionel Heald:
I came here ...

disposed to accept the view of the Home Secretary.

But I have been changed in my view by what I have heard in the
debate.
And the member from Blackpool:
If the House were given a free vote, the proposal would be thrown
out neck and crop, and quite rightly so.
When it became clear that the vote would not be "freed" and party
discipline invoked instead, the member from Tiverton asked why "the
Home Secretary has nobbled his own jury." In the end party discipline
did in fact decide the case of the Home Secretary versus Kalven-Zeisel
and their "American evidence," by a vote of 180 to 102.
The Chicago Bar Record is pleased to let the argument speak for itself:

A

S a blueprint, the AngloAmerican jury appears to be
an extraordinary way of arranging the administration of human
justice. It recruits at random from
a wide population a group of lay-

men; it entrusts them with great
powers; it requires from them formidable feats of attention, recall,
and judgment; it permits them to
carry out their deliberations in
secret and to report on their de-
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cisions without giving reasons;
although their function is to arbitrate sharply contested disputes, it
asks that they come to a unanimous conclusion; and when their
momentary service to the state has
been completed, it orders them to
disband and return to private life.
The jury personnel is ever-changing and ever inexperienced. The
jury is thus by definition an exciting experiment in government,
and it is not surprising that virtually from its inception it has
been the subject of deep controversy attracting in each generation the most harsh criticism and
the most extravagant praise.
For over a decade the University of Chicago Law School has
been engaged in a large scale study
of the jury system. By a variety
of methods it has sought to discover how in fact the jury does
behave. A principal report of the
project was published by us late
last summer as The American
Jury.* It is our present purpose
to give a brief sketch of the
method, scope, and principal findings of the study, and then to turn
directly to the current English
controversy over the jury which,
as we understand it, centers on the
desirability of relaxing the rule
that jury verdicts be unanimous.
The American Jury is devoted
to answering a single question,
which we believe to underlie most
debate over the jury: How would
judge and jury decide the same
case? Implicit in arguments over
the institution must be an assumption that in some instances trial
by jury and trial by judge will
yield different results and that in
these differences will be found the
basis either for praising the jury's
distinctive contributions or the
basis for condemning its distinctive shortcomings.
The research design was simple
and straightforward. With the cooperation of a national sample of

over 500 trial judges, we collected
reports on 3,576 actual criminal
jury trials. These reports furnished four sets of information
about each case: (i) descriptive
facts about the case, the charge,
the parties, the evidence, the counsel, etc.; (ii) the actual verdict of
the jury; (iii) how the judge
would have decided the case had it
been tried before him without a
jury, that is, a hypothetical judge
verdict; and (iv) in cases where
the two verdicts differed, comments by the judge as to what in
his opinion accounted for the disagreement. It was thus possible
for us to approximate the grand
experiment of having each case,
across the whole range of jury
business, tried twice-once to the
judge and once to the jury. The
heart of the study, therefore, is a
careful comparison and analysis of
the two verdicts for each case, the
actual jury verdict and the hypothetical judge verdict.
We were able to establish that
our sample was satisfactorily representative of the roughly 60,000
criminal jury trials conducted in
the United States each year. And
by a variety of techniques of analysis we were able not only to measure with precision the magnitude
and direction of disagreement between judge and jury but also to
locate explanations for such disagreements in the overwhelming
majority of cases. The result is
thus a detailed profile of the way
the jury performs, drawn against
the baseline of the judge.
One in Four Disagreement
We begin with the basic result.
In 13.4 per cent of cases, the jury
* With the collaboration of Thomas Callahan
and Philip Ennis. Little, Brown & Co., Boston,
1966.
The project has also published Zeisel,
Kalven, and Bueholz, Delay in the Courts (1959),
and will publish later this year, Simon, The
Amterican Jury-The D eense of Insanity. The
project has made extensive use of post-trial juror
interviews, mock experimental jury trials, opinion
polls, and various other survey techniques.
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and judge agree to acquit and in
62.0 per cent of cases they agree to
convict. In all then, they agree on
the issue of guilt 75.4 per cent of
the time. It is not altogether easy
to know just what to make of this
figure, since there has been so
little expectation, in legal tradition, at least in quantitative terms,
as to how often the jury should
agree with the judge. We are
really not sure whether this is
more or less agreement than we
had expected-or wanted. Our own
formula has been to read the table
as showing that the jury agrees
with the judge often enough to be
reassuring, and disagrees with
him often enough to be interesting!
The direction of the disagreement, as would be expected, shows
the jury decisively in favor of the
defendant. In 16.9 per cent of
cases the jury acquits where the
judge would have convicted;
whereas in only 2.2 per cent of the
cases do we find the converse, the
judge acquitting where the jury
convicted. In 5.5 per cent of all
trials the jury fails to, reach unanimity. Further we can say that
if all cases now tried to American
juries were to be tried to judges
alone, the acquittal rate would
drop from 30.3 per cent to 16.7 per
cent, or to virtually one-half its
present level.
One should not unduly stress the
directionality of the disagreement
nor herald the table as itself an
empirical proof that the criminal
jury is a safeguard for the citizen
accused of crime. It must be remembered that by and large the
defendant, especially under American law and practice, can select
the cases that are to come to the
jury for trial. He has the alternative options of pleading guilty and
avoiding trial altogether or, more
important, of waiving a jury trial
and going to trial before the judge
alone. Presumably he goes to jury
trial in cases where he thinks he

has something to gain from this
mode of trial.
We do not have any directly
comparable data on English juries.
However, Lord Parker held informal conversations with senior
Queen's Bench judges about their
impressions as to the frequency
with which they disagreed with
their juries. Lord Parker was kind
enough to communicate the gist of
these conversations to us and we
were able to offer a tentative tabulation in the appendix of our study.
It would seem that, although the
direction of disagreement is much
the same, the magnitude of disagreement is significantly less for
English judges and English juries.
Whether this reflects a greater
conformity of popular sentiment to
law in England or the greater control the English judge exercises
over the trial process would be an
inviting topic for further research.
The main task of the study was
not to measure the disagreement
but to explain it. Within the present compass we cannot aspire to
do more than sketch the main lines
of explanation. The detail, the human interest of the jury's response, the texture, as it were, or
the explanations, really cannot be
conveyed so briefly.
To begin with, we are able to
rule out one line of explanation
which has had some popularity in
the United States-namely, that
the jury disagrees with the judge
because it does not understand the
case before it. We find ample evidence that the jury does understand, and it is striking that only
in a single instance does the trial
judge suggest the jury's failure to
understand as a reason for disagreement. The upshot is that
when the jury does diverge from
the judge, it does so for more interesting reasons.
We are able, too, to place in perspective the role of the trial lawyer. The judges rated the skill of
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opposing counsel in each case, enabling us to study and compare
cases in which counsel were evenly
matched and cases in which either
defense or prosecution counsel was
superior. Disparity of counsel
served to explain only some 4 per
cent of all disagreements. In over
three-fourths of the cases the
judge found the lawyers equally
matched and only in roughly one
case in ten where they were not
evenly matched, did the imbalance
contribute to the disagreement between jury and judge. The study
does not eliminate the, possibility
that some of the legendary heroes
of the trial bar did and do have
extraordinary powers to move a
jury; it does, however, dispel any
notion that the jury is constantly
swayed by the rhetoric and demagoguery of the trial advocate, or
any companion notion that the
jury "tries" the lawyers and not
the case.
The Place of Sentiment
We find, as observers of the jury
have always known, that the jury
does not limit itself to its classic
role of trying issues of fact. It
imports into the trial process its
sentiments about the defendant
and about the law. For the most
part, however, it does so not by
any open revolt against the law
but in the guise of resolving close
questions of fact. The sentiment
gives direction to the resolution of
the evidentiary doubt; the evidentiary doubt provides a favorable
condition for a response to the
sentiment. As we put it in the
study: "The closeness of the evidence makes it possible for the
jury to respond to sentiment by
liberatingit from the discipline of
the evidence." Or as one judge put
it, in such cases "the jurors hunt
for doubt."
An interesting but mysterious
cluster of jury sentiments center
on the character and personality

of the defendant. To some extent
the jury tries the criminal and not
the crime. And it is moved more
than the judge by the myriad of
factors that make a person sympathetic or unsympathetic. Although
the Human Comedy seems to
march across the pages of the
judges' commentaries on the questionnaires-the cripple, the minister, the pregnant wife, the war
veteran, the young, the aged, the
bullied pretty blonde wife, the
helpless alcoholic, the homosexual,
and so on-we find in the end that
the jury's response to the person
of the defendant is modest and accounts for only 11 per cent of the
disagreement between judge and
jury.
The most colorful sources of disagreement between jury and judge
are what we have called jury sentiments about the law. Here we
pick up reflections of the popular
sense of justice and the study becomes in effect a special kind of
comparative law, a juxtaposing of
two legal systems, that of the
judge and that of the jury. Here
especially summarization cannot
communicate adequately the flavor
and subtlety, and often insight, of
the jury response which required
over a dozen chapters and a third
of the text in a 500 page book to
report out. It may be of some
small use, however, simply to enumerate the titles of the chapters
in which these sentiments are
discussed:
The Boundaries of Self Defense
Contributory Fault of the
Victim
De Minimis
Unpopular Laws
Defendant Has Been Punished
Enough
Punishment Threatened is Too
Severe
Preferential Treatment
Improper Police and Prosecution Practices
Inadvertent Conduct as
Criminal
CHICAGO BAR RECORD
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Insanity and Intoxication
Crime in a Sub-Culture
Pro-Prosecution Equities
For the most part these sentiments are found in the disagreement cases where it was the jury
which was the more lenient; hence
they are sentiments favorable to
the accused. When, however, we
examine the 2.2 per cent cases in
which it was the jury which was
more punitive than the judge, we
continue to find the jury's sense of
equity at work, but responding
now to "pro-prosecution equities."
Our final conclusion, to borrow
again the words of the book, is:
We suspect there is little or
no intrinsic directionality in the
jury's response. It is not fundamentally defendant-prone, rather
it is non-rule minded; it will
move where the equities are.
And where the equities are at
any given time will depend on
both the state of the law and the
climate of public opinion.
English Reform Proposals
So much for a general view of
the jury's performance. We turn
now to the question immediately
before the English bar and public,
whether to change the law so as to
permit juries in criminal cases to
reach verdicts when the vote is
10:2 or 11:1, in lieu of requirng
that all verdicts be unanimous.
Our study offers some data about
deadlocked juries (or in the American usage, hung juries) which,
granting differences between English and American juries, may
have a bearing on the current
controversy.
The rationale for the proposed
change in the law, as we get it, is
that it will prevent one or two corrupt jurors from defeating justice
and the will of the overwhelming
majority of the jury by forcing the
jury to fail to reach agreement.
The argument has been buttressed

by the disclosure that a surprisingly high proportion of English
jurors have been found to have a
criminal record.
Before turning to our data, we
cannot suppress one observation
about the argument on behalf of
the change. It strikes us that the
burden of proof has not been met.
The very nature of the unanimity
rule is that it leaves the jury vulnerable to the bribing of a single
juror. The jury has had this weakness, if it be one, for some centures now and it seems a little late
in the day suddenly to notice it.
To our ear, admittedly not attuned
to the details of the current English debate, it is somewhat like
suddenly discovering that the jury
has 12 laymen on it and urging,
therefore, that it be abolished.*
We would add, too, that the unanimity rule may provide a useful
symbol of the patience of criminal
justice and of the traditions requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. Moreover, it may provide a
guarantee that the jury will deliberate fully since under the
unanimity rule the dissenting minority, whatever its size, must be
heard. Our special province here,
however, is not to add to the theoretical speculations, but to marshall empirical data in order to
clarify what a decision either way
implies.
We would recall from the basic
table of judge and jury verdicts,
that the American jury fails to
agree a little over 5 per cent of the
time, and there is reason to believe
the figure for the English jury is
about the same.
More important we have from
our study the distribution of the
last vote at which the jury was
declared deadlocked and thus can
ascertain how frequently the one
* Even if there were proof of widespread malfeasance by English juries, the proposal of the
Criminal Justice Bill to screen out recent exconvicts from jury service might for all we know
remedy the situation.
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or two man hung jury arises. The
distribution of votes is as follows:
TABLE 1
Last Vote of Deadlocked Juries
Vote for Conviction
Per Cent

11:1
10:2
9:3
8:4
7:5
6:6
5:7
4:8
3:9
2:10
1:11

24
10
10
6
13
13
8
4
4
8

100%
Number of Juries in Sample-48
We see that (24 + 10 + 8) 42
per cent of the hung juries ended
with an 11:1 or 10:2 vote. Since
a litte over 5 per cent of all juries
hang, and since 42 per cent of the
hung juries hang with such small
minorities in dissent, we can say
that in 42 per cent of 5 per cent,
or roughly in two trials out of 100
has the problem arisen. Moreover,
we can check this estimate against
another source. A few American
jurisdictions permit majority verdicts in criminal cases although
only one, Oregon, allows them in
felony cases. If we compare the
frequency of hung juries in the
two sets of jurisdictions, we arrive
at about the same result. The frequency of deadlocked juries in
states with unanimity is 5.6 per
cent; in states with majority verdicts, it is 3.1 per cent. The reform proposal then would have the
consequence of transforming these
two cases in 100 from hung juries
into verdicts. Can anything be
said about the desirability of this
step ?
Corruption as a Factor
In the course of our study we
asked the judges to rate jury verdicts in cases where there was
disagreement. We give below the

judges' rating in those cases of
hung juries which ended with an
11:1 or 10:2 vote:
A decision a judge might also
come to .................. 34 per cent
Tenable for a jury but not
for a judge .............. 22 per cent
Without merit ..............
44 per cent

The figures thus indicate that in
somewhat less than half of these
cases does the judge feel that the
deadlocking of the jury by the extreme minority was a miscarriage
of justice. In the world of the
jury, as well as elsewhere in life,
there is no guarantee that a minority, even a small minority, will
always be wrong.
The real question, of course, is
how often the extreme minority
dissent is due to corruption of the
juror rather than to some difficulty in the case itself. We have
two lines of data that bear on this.
First, in none of our 200 or so
hung jury cases did the trial judge
even suggest that there was anything suspicious about the jury
deadlock, a fact of perhaps some
significance for the problem at
hand.
More important, we have data
on the first ballot votes of juries
that eventually deadlock. The following figures are for a special
sample of 155 juries for which we
have first ballot votes and final
outcomes:
TABLE 2
Per Cent of Deadlocked Juries as
Related to their First Ballot
FirstBallott
Per Cent of Juries that
Not
Reached
Guilty
Guilty
a Verdict Disagreed

11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

1

100%

-

2

100%

-

3
4

100%

-

85%

15%

8)
109

93%

11

100%
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The figures suggest a fascinating point about human behavior.
A jury will not hang unless there
is initially a massive minority of
four to five jurors. The point is
that for most men, as other experiments in group psychology corroborate, companionship in dissent, at
least at the outset, is required if
they are to withstand the pressure
of confronting a large majority.
Hence the lone juror who finally
hangs the jury will not emerge,
according to these data, unless at
the start his view had some
support.
The point is relevant, too, to the
rationale for the proposed change.
The first ballot vote may be taken
as some index of the ambiguity
and difficulty of the case. And, if
we so read it, it follows that hung
juries, whatever the final vote, are
largely the product of difficulties
in the case. Hence in the absence
of direct and specific evidence of
scandal, there is nothing in the
hung jury phenomenon, even when
a small minority finally deadlocks
the jury, which compels, or is even
compatible with the view that
hung juries are caused by a lone
corrupt juror holding out against
the objective weight of the
evidence.
Nor is this quite all. There is
the question of whether abandoning the unanimity rule will increase the number of non-unanimous verdicts. We can project
from Table 2 that there will be
such verdicts in at least 2 per cent
of all cases, those that were formerly hung at 11:1 or 10:2. However the experience in Oregon has
been that under the majority verdict ru'e the number of nonunanimous verdicts rose to 25 per
cent. Apparently the jury simply
stops deliberating when it reaches
the requisite majority. English
traditions may thus find jury verdicts under the proposed rule more
disturbing than has been realized.

For it will mean convicting men in
a substantial number of cases
when it is publicly disclosed that
some of those trying them did not
find them guilty.
To summarize then what the
data about hung juries has shown:
(i) The proposed reform will
affect only two out of every 100
jury verdicts-the jury will still
be deadlocked in three out of every
100 trials; (ii) The most likely
explanation for the 10:2 or 11:1
deadlocked juries is that it is a response to genuine difficulties in the
case; instances of corrupt or idiosyncratic lone jurors hanging the
jury would appear to be exceedingly rare; (iii) Under the reform,
convictions based on non-unanimous verdicts are likely to appear
in considerably more than two out
of every 100 trials.*
We hope that this report on
some aspects of our research on
the jury has served as an introduction to a new kind of study of legal
institutions and problems, one that
is empirically oriented and depends upon a partnership of lawyer and social scientist, and also
that it has served as a reminder,
if one were needed, of how extraordinarily interesting and daring
an experiment the Anglo-American jury is. And finally we hope
that the discussion of the unanimity rule can furnish a modest
example of how empirical study
can assist in the resolution of
issues of policy.
* To be sure, other jury systems operate quite
satisfactorily without requiring a public verdict
that is unanimous. The Scottish 15 men jury, for
instance, as is well known, decides with a simple
majority of votes. The 12 men juries on the
European
continent
require usually
a threefourths majority for a finding of guilty; anything
hss acquits the defendant, there can be therefore
no
ctry
deadlock. An odd variant is probably the
Brazilian jury which is not allowed to deliberate:
at the end of the trial each juror is simply polled
it "-ri'ing, the votes are counted and the ma5orit., decides. And then there is, of course, the
S'a'
of Oregon which allows the very 10:2 and
11:1 verdicts which the Criminal Justice Bill
prooses for England, and justicein Oregon has
no' broken down; but then also nobody has ever
c'" ted that Oregon justice is superior to justice
el.":e
here.
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trapped?

A lawyer's time is money. And nobody knows it better than
Continental.
But when you're trapped with too much work, some clients
can suffer. The same goes for you. What can you do about it?
One solution is to hire more people full-time. But that's expensive. Another answer is Continental's Trust Department.
That's what we're here for.
We have dozens of people whose only job is to help you help
your clients.
We'll help with the spade work, the leg work, the paper
work. In fact, all the work that's not of a legal nature.
Next time a client needs extra help with his investments...
or his oil interests ...

or his company's retirement plan ...

or

the evaluation of a close-held corporation... or anythinggive us a jingle.
We'll make your work load lighter.
See, things aren't so grim after all.

CONTINENTAL
BANK
Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust

Company of Chicago

231 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois 60690
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DON R. JENSEN & COMPANY OFFERS:
" A Complete Bond Service for Lawyers.
" Substantial Savings on Premium Cost to Estates and
Clients.
" Commission Paid to Insurance Broker of Attorney's
Choice.
* Phone Our Office and We Will Mail Desired Bond to
You on Same Day. (Will deliver when necessary.)
" A Market for EVERY Form of Bond, including those
required by Chicago Title and Trust Company.

DON R. JENSEN & COMPANY
330 SOUTH WELLS STREET, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60606
TELEPHONE 939 5240

General Agents for Insurance and Bonding Companies Since 1931

MAY-JUNE, 1967

HeinOnline -- 48 Chi. B. Rec. 203 1966-1967

